INTRODUCTION
Attempters 1, 2, and 3 set out to execute very similar crimes: each has the goal of shooting his respective victim with a sniper rifle. Each attempter, at different times and locations, spots his respective victim at home and has a clear shot at shooting the victim through one of the house windows.
Attempter 1 pulls the trigger without hesitation, but unbeknownst to him, the window is bullet-proof. Unsuccessful at his attempt at murdering his victim, Attempter 1 withdraws from the crime scene. This action, which I call Attempt 1, constitutes a completed attempt because Attempter 1 has taken all necessary steps to accomplish his crime, but he has failed due to external factors.
Attempter 2, before pulling the trigger, notices a number of surveillance cameras around the victim's house and decides to abandon his criminal plan. Attempt 2 constitutes an abandoned attempt, where the abandonment is presumably motivated by the desire to avoid a high likelihood of detection.
Attempter 3, while looking at his victim through his rifle's scope to get an accurate aim, suddenly feels a sense of sympathy, compassion, and mercy towards his victim. He prays for forgiveness, abandons his plan, and walks away from the scene. This action, which I call Attempt 3, constitutes an abandoned attempt, where the abandonment is motivated by a true change of heart.
The three scenarios described above all constitute attempted murder. Despite this, intuition might dictate that the would-be murderers in each scenario ought to be treated differently. Is there a sound basis, beyond simple intuition, supporting this normative view? In this Article I demonstrate that the objective of optimal crime prevention through deterrence and incapacitation suggests that all three attempts ought to be punished differently. 1 In particular, I argue that abandoned attempts (i.e., Attempts 2 and 3) ought to be punished less severely than completed attempts, and Attempt 3 ought to be punished less severely than Attempt 2 based on the distinct nature of the events that led to abandonment in these two scenarios and what it tells about the attempter's likelihood of recidivating.
Contrary to what my analysis suggests, many jurisdictions either do not distinguish between any of the three types of attempts 2 or treat Attempts 1 and 2 similarly but distinguish them from Attempt 3. 3 Another issue is that 1 . This Article provides a consequentialist analysis that uses the tools of law and economics. It does not provide an analysis of retributive justice considerations. See also infra note 35 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of the particular consequentialist methodology used in this Article. most jurisdictions either fully excuse an abandoned attempt or do not provide a defense at all. 4 Perhaps due to these features of the law, decisionmakers occasionally bend or creatively interpret the law to produce outcomes that comport more with what are presumably their intuitive notions of justice. 5 This type of behavior represents a symptom of the suboptimality of the current state of the law governing attempts, which I argue can be remedied by the use of penalty mitigations for abandonments.
The law and economics (L&E) literature 6 has not fully and formally studied the various types of attempts, either; virtually all previous studies 4 . See 5. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 71 (1988) (observing that courts may engage in this type of behavior: "The courts use several different techniques to give effect to the institutional principle that an announced rule that substantially fails to satisfy the standards of social congruence and systemic consistency should not be consistently applied and extended. Perhaps the most common of these techniques is to draw distinctions, in the form of exceptions, that seem plausible in form but are in substance either inconsistent with the announced rule, given the social propositions that support the rule, or impossible to administer in such a way that cases are treated in a consistent fashion." (footnote omitted)); see infra Part V.A (illustrating through examples how courts have creatively interpreted attempt laws in abandonment cases).
6. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Criminal Attempts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 546-49 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (commenting on the marginal deterrence effect of sanctioning attempts less severely and summarizing points made in Shavell 435 (1990) [hereinafter Shavell, Punishment of Attempts] (constructing a formal model of attempts and optimal deterrence that does not distinguish between various types of attempts, and making comments and conjectures about the possibility of using different sanctions for different types of attempts in the discussion section of the article); Manuel A. Utset, Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economics [Vol. 67:1:1 of attempts mainly focus on attempts generally 7 and distinguish between, for instance, completed attempts and abandoned attempts only while considering implications of their main analyses. 8 Neither has the non-L&E scholarship generated a comprehensive analysis identifying specific tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of having an abandonment defense. 9 The lack of a systematic and sophisticated study of different types of attempts causes an apparent under-appreciation of the trade-off between what I call the marginal deterrence and ex-ante deterrence effects of punishment schemes for attempts.
10
From a consequentialist perspective, the key difference between a completed attempt and an abandoned attempt is in the risk created by each. A completed attempt creates a risk of social harm beyond that which is created by an abandoned attempt: someone who abandons his attempt forgoes the opportunity to complete the harmful conduct that criminal laws prohibit. Therefore, mitigating the punishment for abandoned attempts could reduce social harm if, by punishing abandoned attempts less severely, punishment schemes can induce offenders to withdraw from their and the execution, it is proper to reserve the greater punishment for the actual commission, that even after the attempt there may be a motive for desisting.").
8. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 6; Kramer, supra note 6; Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6. Commenting on the possibility of recognizing abandonment as a factor affecting sanctions, these articles do not specifically model how penalty mitigations for abandoned attempts can affect the tradeoff between marginal and ex-ante deterrence, as is done infra Part III.D; as a result, the articles do not comment on the importance of the predictability of the events causing the abandonment, which is an issue covered infra Part IV.A.
9. Despite identifying various important functions of penalty reductions for abandonments, including marginal deterrence and separating between dangerous and non-dangerous offenders, the non-L&E articles do not formalize the trade-off between marginal and ex-ante deterrence and, therefore, are unable to point out the importance of predictability of the events causing the abandonment as a factor in the determination of the appropriate penalty for abandoned attempts. criminal conduct. This type of punishment scheme, which deters the completion of the crime but not its initiation, is said to achieve marginal deterrence.
11
Unsurprisingly, however, the strategy of punishing abandoned attempts less severely creates a problem. Consider a punishment scheme fully excusing (by which I mean the functional equivalent of not punishing the offender) would-be offenders who abandon their crimes. If this strategy were in place, it would be costless for a potential offender to initiate a criminal plan 12 and abandon it if, after scoping out the scene and observing an unexpected number of police officers, he determines that he is likely to be detected and convicted. This would make the initiation of criminal plans a much better bet. If completing the crime turns out to have a positive expected return, the criminal completes it; if it has a negative expected return, he abandons it and gets off for free. Therefore, the average return from initiating a criminal plan would be positive, and many potential offenders would be induced to commit crimes. This illustrates why fully excusing offenders for abandoning criminal attempts has a negative effect on ex-ante deterrence, which refers to the discouraging of criminal acts at the initiation stage.
13
In this Article, I first focus on the trade-off between the marginal deterrence and ex-ante deterrence effects of providing penalty reductions for abandoning of attempts. I begin by developing a benchmark model of deterrence and rational decision-making, which illustrates that reducing the penalty for abandoned attempts can reduce crime by generating a marginal deterrence effect that more than offsets the reduction of the ex-ante deterrence effect. This suggests that our criminal justice system ought to treat completed and abandoned crimes differently, and that the regime should take abandonment of an attempt into account, at a minimum, as a potentially mitigating factor. This reasoning explains why Attempt 1 should be treated differently than Attempt 2 and Attempt 3.
I then consider what factors ought to be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate penalty reduction. One important factor is the predictability of the event that causes the offender to abandon his crime. In this Article, I use the word unpredictable to refer to situations where the offender's assessment of the probability (i.e., subjective probability) of an event taking place is significantly lower than the actual probability (i.e., 11. See infra Part II.A (defining and explaining marginal deterrence in further detail). 12. Costs here refer to the additional expected cost of punishment and therefore exclude the costs of preparation.
13. See infra Parts III.A, III.B (defining and explaining ex-ante deterrence in further detail). [Vol. 67:1:1 objective probability) of the event taking place. 14 The punishment for a criminal who abandons due to unpredictable events should not have an important effect on his decision to initiate a criminal plan because, by definition, the criminal cannot properly account for them. Therefore, the particular choice of punishment should not produce significant ex-ante deterrence. Hence, the previously identified trade-off is tipped in favor of promoting marginal deterrence, and attempts that are abandoned due to unpredictable developments ought to be punished less severely. This reasoning implies that we should punish Attempt 2 more severely than Attempt 3, if we believe that a true "change of heart" is less predictable than an attempter finding out, for example, that there is an unusually strong police presence at the scene.
As the existing literature points out, 15 another important factor in the determination of the appropriate penalty reduction is the information that the abandonment reveals concerning the likelihood with which the attempter is likely to recidivate. Explaining this reasoning requires a brief description of one of the common rationales for punishing attempts in general, which relies on the supposition that attempting to commit a crime reveals that the attempter is dangerous, meaning that he is likely to recidivate. 16 Based on this logic, the claim is that attempters ought to be incapacitated to prevent future crimes. 17 If this is true, 18 then the expected incapacitative benefit from punishing an attempter is directly related to the strength of the information revealed regarding his dangerousness via his attempt. Ceteris paribus, a completed attempt intuitively signals, on average, a greater likelihood of dangerousness compared to an incomplete 14. Similarly, I use the word predictable to refer to situations where the subjective and objective probabilities are close to each other. Alternatively, one could focus on the expected degree of offender optimism regarding the likelihood with which events necessitating abandonment may arise. In this regard, the two terms, as defined in this article, are interchangeable.
15. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 9. 16. This is the main rationale extended and endorsed in the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART 1 § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) ("The judgment is thus that if the defendant manifests a purpose to engage in the type of conduct or to cause the type of result that is forbidden by the criminal law, he has sufficiently exhibited his dangerousness to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions, so long as he otherwise acts with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the completed offense."). See also Hoeber, supra note 9, at 383 (classifying the theory "that attempt liability is justified because [] attempters are dangerous persons" as one of the "major theories of attempt liability").
17. Hoeber, supra note 9, at 383-85 (explaining the Model Penal Code's rationale for punishing attempts).
18. There is significant disagreement on whether this claim is true. Compare id. (arguing that this claim is false, and concluding that "the dangerous-person rationale cannot justify the prohibition of attempts"), with Lee, supra note 9, at 152 ("Attempters who renounce are almost certainly less dangerous than attempters who go through with their target offenses, but are probably more dangerous than members of the public at large. Thus, the relatively moderate dangerousness of abandoning attempters provides a warrant for some reduced degree of incapacitation.").
attempt. 19 Similarly, a person who abandons his attempt because his moral valuation of a criminal act has changed is less likely to recidivate compared to a person who abandons his attempt only for strategic reasons. 20 These observations supply further reasons as to why Attempts 1, 2, and 3 ought to be treated differently.
The law in many jurisdictions approximate, to some degree, what I argue is the optimal punishment scheme for attempts, but they often do so indirectly and incompletely. Although "[t]he traditional common law view is that abandonment cannot be a defense to attempt," 21 currently there are at least two ways in which abandonment can play a role in the determination of an attempter's liability. 22 First, a person's abandonment may signal that the person had previously not possessed or fully formed the requisite intent to commit the relevant crime. 23 In this case, the mens rea element of the attempt would be lacking, and the alleged attempter would escape liability. 24 Second, even in cases where the elements of attempt are present, in some jurisdictions the defendant may have an abandonment defense 25 or a renunciation defense. 26 However, this defense is made available only if the defendant's abandonment was "voluntary" and under limited circumstances. 27 If the defense is made available, on the other hand, the 19. Lee, supra note 9, at 152 (arguing a similar point); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the strength of information revealed through attempts in further detail).
20. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the strength of information revealed through different abandonments in further detail).
21. Hoeber, supra note 9, at 377; see also Lee, supra note 9, at 119 ("[C]ommon law of crimes did not recognize a renunciation defense . . . .").
22. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 605-06; see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 411 n.180 ("Even when abandonment is not recognized as a defense, however, a court may still find a defendant's abandonment relevant in an attempt prosecution.").
23 [31] and in some states the cases in point cannot be reconciled. [32] " Furthermore, "[e]ven when the rule has been adopted by the legislature, judges and lawyers sometimes seem to refuse to accept its existence and argue as if they do not understand it."
33 Given the lack of consensus among some prominent legal scholars on the issue, 34 it is perhaps unsurprising that there is confusion in the law on abandonments. This Article represents an attempt to formalize important factors that affect the normative desirability of potential laws on abandoned attempts with the 34. Compare, e.g., Lee, supra note 9, at 118 ("I will ultimately conclude that there remains sufficient justification to punish even those who have completely and voluntarily renounced their criminal purpose in a timely fashion. . . . I argue that a renunciation should occasion some mitigation of punishment."), and Yaffe, supra note 9, at 780 (arguing that a person who attempts murder and subsequently abandons his attempt "deserves mitigation in his sentence in light of his change of mind, but does not deserve an affirmative defense"), with Crew, supra note 9, at 441 ("argu[ing] that voluntary abandonment is a valid defense to liability for an attempted crime, and that only those attempters who have tried to the best of their ability to complete the intended crime, and have failed because of external circumstances, should be punished"), Hoeber, supra note 9, at 402 ("[A]ttempt liability should not be imposed on those who, having abandoned their efforts, did not try to commit crimes."), and Moriarty, supra note 4, at 2 ("I believe the defense deserves an extension beyond the boundaries presently assigned to it and argue for its expanded application."). See also supra note 6 (listing previous L&E articles analyzing attempts). Because the main focus of these articles is not abandonment of attempts, there is not significant tension between them in terms of what they suggest is the normatively desirable punishment for abandoned attempts. But see Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6, at 334 (pointing out that the "Posner-Shavell . . . theory is not without its difficulties" and questioning the relevance of the marginal deterrence effect of punishing attempts less severely than completed crimes).
hope of providing a coherent framework to discuss how the existing confusion in the law can be alleviated. This framework is constructed by using the L&E methodology and does not focus on retributive justice considerations. 35 In particular, I focus on the deterrent and incapacitative effects of punishment 36 and demonstrate that penalty mitigations are likely to generate reductions in ex-ante deterrence and incapacitative benefits but that they are likely to result in savings in enforcement costs in addition to increasing marginal deterrence. I consider how the trade-off between these benefits and costs is affected by the nature of the abandonment to identify relevant factors in the determination of the optimal penalty mitigation for abandonments.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a simple taxonomy of criminal conduct and criminal attempts and thereby clarifies the precise subject of the Article. Part II formalizes how abandonment defenses can cause marginal deterrence. Part III introduces ex-ante deterrence and identifies a trade-off between marginal deterrence and ex-ante deterrence caused by allowing mitigations in punishment for abandonment of attempts. In Part IV, I consider the incapacitative effect of imprisonment and identify two important factors affecting the normative desirability of penalty mitigations for abandonment of attempts. Part V compares the normative implications of my analysis with existing laws on abandonment and offers a few extensions and conjectures that emerge from my analysis. Part VI concludes.
I. A SIMPLE TAXONOMY OF ATTEMPTS
Distinguishing abandoned attempts from other criminal conduct is necessary for clarifying the scope of the arguments presented in this Article. To start, it should be noted that the Article focuses on conduct committed by individuals, not crimes committed by organized groups, 35 . This only implies that the scope of this article excludes retributivist considerations and not that the normative implications described infra Part V.A are necessarily inconsistent with those that would emerge from a retributivist analysis. 41 where, after robbing a family, "
[o]ne of the perpetrators instructed the other to kill [one of the victims], but when the other perpetrator pulled the trigger in compliance, the gun jammed. The perpetrators then fled from the scene." 42 The court held that these facts were sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder. 43 An incomplete attempt, to the contrary, is one where the criminal has taken substantial steps, but not all steps, that are necessary to complete his crime. If the person has not taken substantial steps to complete his crime, his acts do not constitute an attempt but "mere preparation."
44 Incomplete attempts can be further broken down into two categories: interrupted attempts and abandoned attempts. 45 Interrupted attempts refer to situations where the criminal is prevented from taking further steps to complete his crime and therefore never has a chance to complete it. For instance, a situation where "an individual is prevented from firing his gun by someone who grabs it away" 46 may constitute an interrupted attempt. Abandoned attempts, on the other hand, are situations where the criminal, despite having a chance to continue with his criminal plan, forgoes the opportunity to do so. A case exemplifying abandoned attempts is People v. Johnson. 47 This case involved a defendant who, following a fight with a friend at a bar, went to his house to retrieve and load a gun and subsequently "crawled under a pickup truck across the street to wait for the friend."
48 After the truck's owner approached, the defendant gave the driver some beer, took the keys to the truck, and made the driver sit in the vehicle while he remained underneath. 49 However, after some time passed, the f(A j , S i ) = H for some state(s) of nature S i ; that is, the act A j will result in harm under some circumstances (perhaps many [Vol. 67:1:1 defendant began to sober up and reconsidered his plan to shoot his friend in retaliation for beating him up. 50 By the time police arrived on the scene, the defendant had removed the shells from the firearm and placed them in his pocket. 51 In this fact pattern, because the defendant's attempt was "broken off by [him] , not by the intercession of another," 52 his conduct constitutes an abandoned attempt.
53
This Article focuses mainly on abandoned attempts and questions whether these attempts ought to be punished less severely than completed attempts. Although Part V.D contains comments on the implications of my analysis concerning the proper punishment of interrupted attempts, a formal and complete analysis of interrupted attempts is beyond the scope of this Article.
II. A POSITIVE ANALYSIS: THE MARGINAL DETERRENCE EFFECT

A. Abandonments and Marginal Deterrence
The objective of marginal deterrence was accurately explained more than two hundred years ago by Bentham as "induc[ing] a man to choose always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore, where two offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less." 54 Later, in an influential 1970 article, George Stigler coined the phrase marginal deterrence in reference to this objective: "If the offender will be executed for a minor assault and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder. If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000. Marginal costs are necessary to marginal deterrence."
55
As the excerpt from Stigler's article demonstrates, the term "marginal deterrence" was initially meant to capture the diverting of criminal behavior towards the less harmful crime in cases where a criminal may choose to commit one among many crimes. Since 1970, many L&E scholars have used the phrase to refer to this meaning. 56 A similar type of deterrent effect can be found in the context of abandoned attempts versus other types of criminal conduct. If, despite having taken substantial steps to complete a crime, the availability of a reduction in punishment for abandoning an attempt induces an offender to abandon his criminal conduct, then that punishment scheme achieves a form of marginal deterrence. 57 The label "marginal deterrence" is appropriate because this punishment scheme does not deter the individual from taking substantial steps to commit the crime. Hence, the punishment scheme does not achieve ex-ante deterrence 58 but only a form of marginal deterrence. Richard Posner has also noted the possibility of achieving this type of deterrence through less severe punishments for attempts and has also characterized it as a form of marginal deterrence. Posner notes that one of the rationales for punishing attempts less severely than results is "to give offenders an incentive to change their minds at the last moment (a form of marginal deterrence)." 59 In discussing marginal deterrence effects in the proceeding parts of this Article, I use the term "Defense" to refer to any defense or mitigation in penalty that the defendant is entitled to upon a showing of abandonment. In such contexts, the threat of sanctions plays a role in addition to the usual one of deterring individuals from committing harmful acts: it influences which harmful acts undeterred individuals choose to commit. Notably, undeterred individuals will have a reason to commit less rather than more harmful acts if expected sanctions rise with harm. This tendency is sometimes said to reflect marginal deterrence because an individual will be deterred from committing a more harmful act owing to the difference, or margin, between the expected sanction for it and for a less harmful act." (emphasis omitted)).
57. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 58. See supra text accompanying note 13 and infra Parts III.A, III.B for definitions and explanations of ex-ante deterrence.
59. Posner, supra note 6, at 1217. Professor Shavell also notes a potential marginal deterrence effect but notes that Posner's point does not provide a justification for punishing attempts in general less severely than accomplished crimes because "[t]he argument does not recognize that different sanctions may be imposed for different types of attempt." Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 455. 60. One may question whether the usage of the word "defense" is proper to refer to mitigating factors. This appears to be a simple semantic point. Nevertheless, it can be addressed easily by defining abandoned attempts and completed attempts as separate offenses, and by making abandonment a complete defense against a completed attempt charge. Similar categorizations and defenses exist in the law. Lack of malice aforethought, for instance, provides a complete defense against a murder charge. [Vol. 67:1:1
B. The (Un)importance of Criminals "Changing Their Minds"
In an article analyzing the punishment of attempts, 61 Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel question the relevance and importance of the marginal deterrence rationale proposed by Posner. 62 Specifically, they state:
[Posner's] marginal deterrence application justifies the lenient treatment of attempts as providing incentives for rational criminals to "change their minds" and abandon a plan that they have already begun to pursue. One may wonder why rational individuals would even begin the pursuit of a crime if they expect to change their minds in the process. If the incremental sanction imposed on completed acts is sufficient to generate marginal deterrence, why does it not generate full deterrence and prevent the initiation of precrime activities? After all, a criminal who commits an attempt intends it to succeed, and takes into account the sanction for completed acts. If that does not deter him, why would the same sanction deter him when he has already initiated the act and has only to decide whether to finalize it? Unless the criminal learns new information that leads him to reevaluate the desirability of completing the crime, there is no reason to expect marginal deterrence to operate upon him.
63
Professors Ben-Shahar and Harel are certainly correct in their conclusion, but the conclusion is a conditional one: one that relies on criminals not obtaining new information. 64 There could, however, be many instances in which criminals obtain new information during the course of criminal undertakings. 65 Consider, for instance, a potential offender who is planning to rob a gas station. Ex-ante, he has some estimate of the likelihood of being caught 61. Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6. 62. Posner, supra note 6, at 1217-18. 63. Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 6, at 334 (emphasis added). 64. In Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 456, Professor Shavell anticipates the point made by Ben-Shahar and Harel, and he, too, responds to it by referring to the mixed and fluctuating nature of criminal motives. He states:
[A] similar objection could be made with regard to abandonment-that a person who sets out on a course of conduct would be unlikely to abandon it. Yet this objection is not emphasized in the abandonment context. The reason, I conjecture, is that many people do believe that the motives of those who engage in potentially harmful conduct are complex and subject to change. 65. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 6, at 548 (noting that criminals may discover "pessimistic information in the course of the crime"); Kramer, supra note 6, at 401 (noting that criminals can recalculate their expected utility from completing crime in response to changing circumstances); Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 456; and Utset, supra note 6, at 1207 (noting that criminal preferences are subject to change). during the robbery. 66 He may know, for instance, that there is, on average, a single security guard at the particular gas station. However, he is also aware that this is only the average number of security guards; sometimes there are two security guards, and sometimes there are no security guards present at the gas station. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the potential criminal can re-evaluate (implicitly or explicitly) the likelihood of being caught upon arrival at the gas station 67 since he can observe how many security guards are present, how many cameras are installed, whether there are police officers patrolling the neighborhood, and so on. Moreover, external factors need not be the only source of new information. A criminal may re-evaluate his benefits from crime, 68 correct his optimism 69 upon confronting danger, and rid himself of his false expectations regarding his preferences. 70 Given that criminals may acquire more information (from external as well as internal factors) after taking several steps to complete a crime, there are reasons to expect marginal deterrence to operate on them. In particular, the Defense can give people an incentive to abandon criminal activity upon discovering new information. In the next Section, I formalize this idea with a simple decision tree. 70. See Utset, supra note 6, at 1207 ("There is a large empirical literature finding that people routinely mispredict the extent to which their preferences may change over time. This is due to a projection bias: When trying to predict their future tastes and preferences, people will give undue weight to their current tastes and preferences."). 
C. Formalizing the Marginal Deterrence Effect
72 His intention is to kill Alyona with the axe to steal some valuable items from her. He knocks on Alyona's door and forces his way into her apartment. 73 Once in the apartment, Raskolnikov takes out the axe and prepares to strike. 74 But in this version, unlike in Crime and Punishment, he sees Alyona's sister, Lizaveta, walk into the room right before he is about to swing it towards Alyona. Raskolnikov is unsure about whether Lizaveta or Alyona has yet seen his axe. Raskolnikov appears to have two choices: (i) put the axe back in his coat, hope that the two women have not seen it, and leave Alyona's apartment; and (ii) kill both women and proceed with the initial plan.
While 
Figure B. Raskolnikov's Decision Tree
If Raskolnikov continues, he expects Lizaveta's arrival to cause the probability of his capture to be 1/3. Should Raskolnikov be captured, he expects to be exiled to Siberia, 76 which he equates to a loss of $120,000. If, however, he is not caught-which happens with a probability of 2/3-he expects to steal about $30,000 worth of valuable items from Alyona. According to these numbers, his expected return from continuing with the robbery is: 1/3 x (-$120,000) + 2/3 x ($30,000) = -$20,000.
On the other hand, if Raskolnikov abandons his crime, he estimates that he will be caught with a probability of 1/5, in which case his fate will depend on whether or not the Defense is available and whether it is applicable to his case. In particular, if the Defense is not available, assume briefly that Raskolnikov will be found guilty for attempted murder and that this is punished as severely as the murdering of the two sisters. In this case, Raskolnikov's expected return from abandoning is: 1/5 x (-$120,000) + 4/5 x ($0) = -$24,000. If the Defense is available, and it operates as a complete defense, Raskolnikov's expected return from abandoning is $0.
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Comparing these two numbers to Raskolnikov's expected return from continuing with the robbery implies that Raskolnikov will be deterred from continuing with his plan only when the Defense is available. This type of deterrence effect, which is not produced when Raskolnikov is punished 76 . This is what ends up happening to Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 71.
77. This assumption is mainly simplifying, and the effects of relaxing it are discussed in the next paragraph.
Of course, this is a single and simple example, which abstracts from some relevant issues. One may ask, for instance, what would have happened if the punishment for abandoned attempts was intermediate, that is, between $0 and $120,000. It is easy to verify that marginal deterrence would be achieved, holding everything else constant, if the punishment for Raskolnikov's abandoned attempt was the equivalent of less than $100,000. Hence, a complete defense is sufficient but not necessary, in this example, to generate marginal deterrence. On the other hand, other considerations, such as ex-ante deterrence, may make partial sentence reductions more appealing than complete defenses. In order to discuss this and other issues, a more elaborate analysis is necessary, which requires addressing points raised by scholars in previous analyses.
As pointed out by professors Ben-Shahar and Harel, 78 it is unclear whether and why sanctions sufficient to deter Raskolnikov from continuing with his plan are insufficient to deter Raskolnikov from going to Alyona's apartment with the intent to murder her in the first place. After all, his expected return is at most $0 in the game tree represented by Figure B . So why, then, would Raskolnikov want to rob Alyona's apartment in the first place? The reason for this may be that absent new information, Raskolnikov believes that it is highly likely for Alyona to be alone at home. Therefore, ex-ante, his pay-off from initiating his criminal plan might be positive, despite the non-positive return in the state of the world where Alyona is not alone. As such, his ex-ante expected pay-off from initiating the criminal plan can be positive. In this case, he would be undeterred from initiating the plan but deterred ex-post from continuing when Lizaveta is present. Because this claim appears to be intuitive, its proof is relegated to Part III, where a larger decision tree is used to analyze the effect of the Defense.
This insight immediately leads to the next important question. The Defense reduces the cost to Raskolnikov in the state of the world where Alyona is not alone from -$20,000 to $0. Might not this reduction in cost cause Raskolnikov to initiate a criminal plan that he otherwise would not have? In other words, might not the Defense be causing a reduction in exante deterrence for purposes of increasing marginal deterrence? If that is the case, would it not be wiser to not have the Defense, since marginal deterrence-that is, inducing Raskolnikov to abandon his crime-would never be necessary if Raskolnikov never initiated a criminal plan?
78. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
Answering these and similar questions requires incorporating "changes in circumstances" into the economic analysis of attempts. Once this is done, one can focus on the trade-off between marginal and ex-ante deterrence and demonstrate that the marginal deterrence effect can off-set the ex-ante deterrence effect. Furthermore, once the benchmark model of deterrence and rational decision-making is structured, one can consider the effects of other considerations including behavioral deviations from rationality and the incapacitative effect of imprisonment.
III. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN MARGINAL DETERRENCE AND EX-ANTE DETERRENCE
A. Incorporating "Changes in Circumstances" into the Economic Analysis of Attempts
Existing formal economics models of attempts mainly focus on whether attempts in general ought to be punished less severely than results.
79 These models do not incorporate the possibility of offenders acquiring new information between the time the potential offender triggers potential liability for attempts and the time when he is in a position to take the last step necessary to complete his crime. 80 When the incorporation of such information is recognized, one can talk about potential changes in circumstances.
While contemplating performing a criminal act, a rational potential offender considers how things are likely to develop. The rational potential offender initiates his criminal plan where there is a positive ex-ante expected return associated with the criminal act. However, between the time he initiates his plan and the time the final step necessary to complete the crime must be taken, circumstances may change. Circumstances may appear to be "out of the ordinary," and the potential offender may use this new information to re-calculate his expected returns from completing the offense. In other words, the expected return associated with the crime may 79 . See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 80. See, for example, the modeling in Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 438, where the temporal dimension of the criminal act is not considered, and therefore, there is no room for the criminal to incorporate new information:
An individual may commit a potentially harmful act from which he will obtain a benefit. If he commits such an act, harm will occur with some probability q, and harm will not occur with the complementary probability 1 -q. In the latter case, we will say that the individual committed only an attempt. As professor Shavell later notes, the temporal dimension of criminal acts has been noted in the eighteenth century by Beccaria. See BECCARIA, supra note 7, at 138 ("as there may be an interval of time between the attempt and the execution"). That offenders may incorporate new information within this "interval of time" has later been noted by modern scholars. See supra notes 64-65.
deviate significantly from what the criminal had initially anticipated. If the expected return is higher than what the criminal had initially anticipated, he will continue with the crime. If, however, the expected return deviates significantly and negatively from the return the criminal had initially calculated, the criminal must re-evaluate his decision. If abandoned attempts are punished less severely, then, as explained in the previous Part, the potential criminal may be induced to abandon his criminal plan.
To incorporate this idea, existing economic models of criminal decision-making 81 must be modified to allow for multiple states of the world, each generating a different expected return associated with continuing with crime. The simplest way to incorporate this change is by assuming that the criminal act involves three periods. In Period 1 the potential criminal decides whether or not to initiate a criminal plan, that is, whether or not to begin his criminal activity. If he goes ahead with the criminal act, in Period 2, new information is revealed to the criminal; he finds out whether he is in advantageous or detrimental circumstances. Given this new information, the criminal decides whether to abandon the criminal act or to continue with it. In Period 3 he is either punished or evades detection and thereby avoids punishment. If he continues with the crime, he risks being caught for the completed offense or for a nonabandoned criminal attempt. But he may also evade detection and benefit from his crime. If, on the other hand, he abandons his crime, then he forgoes the possibility of acquiring criminal benefits and risks being punished for an abandoned criminal attempt. This model is conveniently summarized by the following decision tree: deterrence is to be achieved, it must be true that the potential offender is induced to abandon his criminal act in Period 2 when he reaches the "bad state" due to the existence of such a reduction. If this is the case, then the potential offender's expected pay-off in the "bad state" must be increased from π b to -q h s r by virtue of the penalty reduction. 82 This naturally raises the ex-ante expected pay-off to the criminal by the difference between these two pay-offs (i.e., -q h s r -π b ), discounted by the probability (i.e., 1-λ) with which the criminal will end up in the "bad state": (1-λ) (-q h s r -π b ) .
This implies that there could be circumstances in which, but for the reduction in penalty for the abandoned attempt, the potential criminal could have been deterred from crime ex-ante. To see this, note that absent the marginal deterrence effect of reduced penalties for abandoned attempts, the criminal's pay-off is given by (1-λ)π b + λπ g . If this number is negative but close to zero, say -$10, it could be the case that the additional reduction in expected penalties due to mitigations in penalties for abandoned attempts (i.e., (1-λ)(-q h s r -π b )) is sufficient to induce the potential offender to commit crime. In fact, as long as (1-λ)(-q h s r -π b ) > $10, the Defense will induce the criminal to initiate a plan that he would otherwise not. This naturally raises the following question: assuming rational decision-making, can the Defense reduce crime?
C. A Preliminary Result: Penalty Reductions for Abandonment Can
Reduce Crime A very simple example will affirmatively answer the aforementioned question. Consider the decision tree illustrated in Figure C , and suppose that π g = $3000; π b = -$300; λ= 40%; q h = 5%
(1).
Solving the decision tree represented in Figure C by backward induction can reveal how the availability of a Defense for abandoning of attempts affects the potential criminal's decisions. 83 Given the values in 82. Note that the marginal deterrence effect cannot be observed in the good state because the criminal is getting a positive pay-off; otherwise, he would not contemplate crime in the first place. This implies that marginal deterrence cannot exist unless the offender is rewarded for abandoning his crime through subsidies.
83. Backward induction is the most commonly used method for determining the equilibria of sequential games. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1996) ("In analyzing this case, as well as subsequent cases, we are going to apply 'backward induction.' This approach is the standard method used by economists for analyzing strategic interactions in which parties make decisions over several time periods."). See also ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 57-61 (1992) (explaining how to use backward induction).
line (1), it is clear that the potential criminal will choose to continue with the crime whenever he is in the "good state," regardless of whether or not the Defense is available. This follows because continuing results in a positive expected pay-off, whereas abandoning results in a maximum payoff of $0. On the other hand, whether or not the criminal abandons the crime in the "bad state" depends on the value of s r , which reflects the potential penalty reduction for abandoned crimes. In particular, if -q h s r (the expected return from abandoning the crime) is greater than π b (the expected return from continuing with the crime) the criminal will abandon the crime; otherwise, he will not. Plugging in the numbers from line (1) reveals that this condition is met when s r < $6,000.
First consider the case where the Defense is not available, so that s r > $6,000. In this case, the potential criminal's expected pay-off from initiating the crime in the first place is
Plugging in the values from line (1) reveals that this corresponds to (0.4 x $3000) + (0.6 x (-$300)) = $1020. Since this number exceeds the value attached to the outside option of not committing crime, the potential criminal decides to initiate the criminal plan. This observation reveals that when the Defense is not available the criminal initiates his plan and executes it in both states of the world (i.e., the good as well as the bad state).
Next, consider the case where the Defense is available, such that s r < $6,000. The potential criminal's expected benefit from initiating the criminal plan is given by
. This is because the potential criminal knows that if things go bad, he will abandon his plan, in which case he will only face the risk of receiving the smaller sanction for abandoned attempts, namely s r , which happens with a probability of q h . In the scenario where he ends up in the good state, he will complete the crime, which results in an expected payoff of π g . This implies that the potential criminal's expected return from initiating his plan must be greater than the corresponding expected return when there is no Defense, namely $1020.
This brief analysis reveals that when the Defense is available, the criminal initiates his plan but does not fully accomplish it 60% of the time, because 60% is the probability with which the criminal enters the "bad state" and abandons the crime. Hence, allowing the Defense for strategic abandoning of crimes lowers the probability of the crime being pursued to completion by 60%. This is the equivalent to a 60% reduction in the crime rate, 84 assuming that there is a continuum of offenders who all have the same characteristics and face criminal opportunities of the type described in line (1).
Although this example abstracts from many relevant issues, it highlights an important function of the Defense: the marginal deterrence effect of the Defense lowers the rate of completed crimes committed by potential offenders whom it would be difficult or impossible to deter exante through harsh penalties. Accordingly, the deterrent effect of the Defense is positively related to: (i) the number of crimes whose initiation cannot be deterred ex-ante through harsh penalties, but whose completion can be deterred ex-post; and (ii) the probability with which the potential criminal enters the "bad state."
D. The Trade-Off Between Marginal Deterrence and Ex-Ante Deterrence
The preceding example and its brief analysis reveal important characteristics of the potential gains from allowing a Defense. The example does not, however, tell us anything regarding the costs of allowing the Defense for abandoned attempts. This is because the preceding example considers a situation in which the potential criminal is one whose decision to initiate the criminal plan is independent of whether or not the Defense is available. If the Defense was applied only in these circumstances, then it would unambiguously reduce crime rates. However, there may be variation among criminals, which is not captured by the previous example. In particular, as discussed briefly in Part III.B, some criminals may have expected returns from committing crime that are low enough for them to be deterred by harsh penalties. The existence of potential offenders of this type might generate costs associated with the Defense in the form of reduced ex-ante deterrence.
To make this point more discrete and to illustrate the trade-off between marginal and ex-ante deterrence, consider two groups of individuals. The first group of potential offenders (Type C) includes those who were considered in Part III.C. Type C people cannot be deterred from initiating the criminal plan through the use of harsh penalties 85 but can be induced to 84 . This result focuses on the instantaneous effect on deterrence and abstracts from incapacitation effects. If offenders are not imprisoned for abandoned attempts, a proportion of them may later try to commit crime again. See infra Part IV.B (discussing incapacitation and potential recidivism); in particular, see infra note 106 (noting that the proportion of re-attempters depends, among other things, on the proportion of attempters encountering criminal opportunities in the future).
85. Harsh penalties refer to the maximal penalty available for a particular offense. One may question why, theoretically, a maximal penalty may exist for a particular offense. There are at least two reasons for this. The first reason is related to marginal deterrence, used in its primary meaning, which abandon their criminal plans in "bad states" if there is a significant reduction in the penalty for abandoned attempts. The second type of potential offenders (Type D) was those considered in Part III.B. Type D individuals can be deterred from even initiating a criminal plan, but only if there are harsh penalties for abandoned attempts.
Given the characteristics of Type C and Type D individuals, an important trade-off emerges between (i) reducing the execution of crimes committed by Type C individuals by allowing the Defense and (ii) reducing the initiation of criminal plans by Type D individuals by not allowing a Defense. This trade-off implies that the optimality of allowing the Defense hinges on 86 the ratio of Type C to Type D individuals as well as the frequency with which individuals enter "bad states" in which they abandon their attempts.
In reality there are, of course, not two types of potential offenders but a much larger number of types. When more types are present it matters not only whether the Defense is available, but also the specific reduction in the penalty for abandoned attempts. In particular, the greater reduction in the penalty will cause greater marginal deterrence effects but at the cost of lower ex-ante deterrence. To see this, consider four groups of individuals: (i) Type 1: those who require a reduction of X in the penalty to abandon their crimes in "bad states"; (ii) Type 2: those who require a reduction of X+1 in the penalty to abandon their crimes in "bad states"; (iii) Type 3: those who are deterred from initiating a criminal plan only if the reduction for abandoned attempts is less than X; and (iv) Type 4: initiating a criminal plan only if the reduction for abandoned attempts is less than X+1.
The following table delineates the effect of various penalty reductions on these individuals' criminal behavior:
is, as defined supra Part II.A, the diverting of criminal behavior towards the less harmful crime in cases where a criminal may choose to commit one among many crimes. "Considerations of marginal deterrence . . . imply that the schedule of sanctions rises with the magnitude of harm. Overall, this acts as a limitation on the size of sanctions." Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 449. Professor Shavell notes a second constraint on the size of sanctions: "[S]ociety may desire that there be some proportionality maintained between the gravity of bad acts and the severity of punishment for them. If so, the size of sanctions for doing harm is limited by the proportionally fair magnitude." Id.
86. Theoretically, the initiation of the plan may cause social harms in addition to the execution of the criminal plan. If that is the case, the ratio between these harms and the harms from the completion of the crime will also affect the optimality of making an abandonment defense available; the greater the ratio, the more important is ex-ante deterrence, and therefore the smaller is the optimal mitigation in punishment. This example with four types of individuals demonstrates the incremental effect of reducing the penalty for abandoned attempts. Given this observation, in theory, one must account for not only the optimality of having a Defense but also the optimal reduction in the penalty for abandoned attempts. As the example establishes, increasing the reduction in penalty increases marginal deterrence but at the cost of a reduction in exante deterrence. Therefore, assuming these costs and benefits behave according to standard economic assumptions, the optimal reduction in penalty will be present where the incremental benefit from marginal deterrence equals the incremental cost from ex-ante deterrence. 87 These incremental benefits and costs, in turn, depend on the relative size of each group (i.e., Types 1-4) and the frequency with which various types enter "bad states."
In plain English, this means that whether and to what extent a Defense should be available for abandoned attempts depends on the number of attempts we expect to be abandoned as a result of the availability of the defense and our belief concerning the number of individuals who would be induced to commit crimes because they get an easy way out of being punished when the Defense is available. Further sophisticated and lengthy analysis is required to gather information on these numbers, and the 87. If incremental benefits always exceed incremental costs, then abandonment ought to operate as a complete defense. Conversely, if incremental costs always exceed the incremental benefit, then it is optimal to not have any reduction in the penalty for abandoned attempts. One can call these "corner solutions." answers to these questions will presumably depend on the type of crime. The objective here is not to supply specific numbers but to provide a list of factors that affect the social value of providing sentence reductions for abandoned crimes. With this objective in mind, I consider in the next Section the potential effects of those considerations from which the benchmark model presented in this Part abstracts.
IV. FACTORS AFFECTING THE NORMATIVE DESIRABILITY OF PENALTY REDUCTIONS FOR ABANDONMENTS
A. Unpredictability of Events Leading to Abandonment
An overwhelming majority of economic analyses of criminal behavior assume that individuals have constant criminal tendencies. 88 In other words, the standard "model assumes that people consistently make the same choices over illegal and legal options. They do not, for instance, park legally today and park illegally tomorrow, unless the expected fine for illegal parking changes over time."
89 An alternative and more realistic assumption is that potential offenders possess "fluctuating criminal tendencies."
90 That is, a potential offender may decide to engage in a criminal act today but forgo the opportunity to engage in a virtually identical act (i.e., an act associated with the same expected return) at some point in the future. At least two reasons 91 on marginal deterrence versus ex-ante deterrence. The Defense will induce the criminal to abandon his attempt when he, during the course of his criminal conduct, possesses a lower than previously anticipated criminal tendency, and this will result in additional benefits due to marginal deterrence. 94 But a similar ex-ante deterrence effect should not be observed because while initiating his criminal plans, the potential offender does not expect to experience fluctuations in his criminal tendencies in the future. Other scholars have noted this before, suggesting that abandonment defenses requiring a complete and voluntary renunciation 95 are unlikely to "embolden those considering some criminal endeavor because they will be more willing to take the first steps toward the crime when they know they can withdraw with impunity." 96 This brief analysis implicitly assumes that a person who experiences a negative shock to his criminal tendency requires an incentive to abandon his criminal conduct. This is not true in situations where the person's criminal benefit fluctuates to negative values, meaning that the person is willing to forgo all criminal benefits in order to avoid committing the criminal act. In these situations, even if the punishments for abandoned attempts and results are equal, the person would be inclined to abandon his conduct. 97 This suggests that the Defense does not have a marginal deterrence effect because the person is "marginally deterred" even without the Defense. Even in these circumstances, there is a second benefit to reducing the punishment for abandoned attempts. The cost of punishment 98 dictates that it is economically wasteful to devote resources to punishing a person when punishment, as in this circumstance, has no ex-ante deterrence effect.
99
The preceding comments reveal that providing the Defense in cases where the crime is abandoned due to unpredictable fluctuations in criminal 94 . This follows because the number of instances where the offender enters a "bad state" increases, and these are exactly the instances in which marginal deterrence is likely to be effective. See supra Part III.D.
95. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 609. 96. Id. 97. This is also true for some individuals when, as in Figure B , the probability of conviction is lower for abandoned attempts than for completed attempts. The difference in the probability of conviction may be sufficient to induce some individuals to abandon their crimes. These individuals, too, do not require penalty reductions to abandon their crimes.
98. Punishment costs and their effect on optimal law enforcement has been studied extensively in the literature. 99. Similar benefits are realized from the mitigated punishment of individuals as described supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. tendencies leads to benefits from marginal deterrence as well as savings in punishment costs. This implies that the Defense is likely to have greater marginal benefits, ceteris paribus, when "changes in circumstances" are caused by unpredictable fluctuations. Therefore, it is optimal to provide greater mitigations in punishment for abandonments caused by this type of fluctuations. The law's distinct treatment of voluntary versus involuntary abandonments 100 can be interpreted as an effort to achieve such separation. But, as I argue in Part V, a greater focus on factors that should go into determining the proper sentence reduction for abandonments rather than creating rigid categories of attempts to define which attempters are fully excused would give rise to an increase in social welfare.
B. Revealed Information on Offender's Dangerousness
The preceding parts, like the majority of economic analyses of criminal law, focus on deterrence as the main goal of criminal law. 101 However, an often neglected function of imprisonment is incapacitating dangerous offenders. 102 One may argue that once incapacitative benefits from imprisonment are accounted for it may be optimal for there to not be an abandonment defense because by initiating the crime the offender has revealed his dangerousness, 103 and by letting him go free the criminal justice system fails to take advantage of an opportunity to prevent recidivism.
104
This argument against the Defense has a few important weaknesses. 105 First, abandonment may signal, albeit in a noisy way, that the criminal has initiated a criminal plan due to mistaken beliefs or irrational behavior, in which case his initiation of the crime signals less about the likelihood 100. See infra Part V.A for a review of existing laws on abandonment. 101. See Mungan, supra note 36, at 175-81 (reviewing existing literature and concluding that "economic theories of crime and law enforcement focus predominantly on deterrence and pay very little attention to rehabilitation and incapacitation" (citation omitted)).
102. Id. at 177-79 (reviewing existing literature and concluding that "[n]ormative L&E analyses of law enforcement that incorporate incapacitation as a justification for punishment are rare").
103. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 104. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 105. Hoeber, supra note 9, at 384-85 argues that the "dangerous-person" rationale cannot justify the prohibition of attempts. In this Part, I consider not whether this rationale can supply a justification for attempt liability, but how, assuming attempt liability is desirable for purposes of achieving deterrence (as is argued in the previous law and economics literature, see, e.g., Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6), social welfare can be increased by making use of noisy signals regarding attempters' dangerousness. A similar approach is taken in Lee, supra note 9, at 152: "Attempters who renounce are almost certainly less dangerous than attempters who go through with their target offenses, but are probably more dangerous than members of the public at large. Thus, the relatively moderate dangerousness of abandoning attempters provides a warrant for some reduced degree of incapacitation." which he will recidivate. 106 In this case, the criminal may not possess the necessary benefit or the necessary talent 107 to make the crime profitable exante. 108 He may have initiated the crime despite this due to temporary miscalculations, optimism, or lack of self-control. 109 At the least, it seems intuitively true that the probability that an abandoning person will recidivate is smaller than the probability with which a non-abandoning person will recidivate (if not imprisoned). Therefore, expected incapacitative benefits associated with eliminating recidivism are not as large as the argument against the Defense would suggest.
Second, even if the person initially possesses the necessary desire and talent to make his criminal plan profitable ex-ante, the act of abandoning and receiving a penalty reduction for it may alter his preferences and reduce his benefits from criminal conduct. 110 A person who sets out to murder a person but later repents his initial intentions and thoughts, for instance, has presumably experienced a shift in his preferences towards the act of murder. Therefore, the person would be less likely to recidivate, and incapacitative benefits from imprisoning him would be lower than one would otherwise think.
Describing the third weakness in the argument against the Defense requires noting that fully excusing an attempter who withdraws is not the only alternative to severely punishing him. He can be punished less severely than the person who completes his attempt. As discussed in the previous part, less severe penalties for abandonment of crimes produce a marginal deterrence effect.
111 A similar effect is unlikely to be gained by reducing the punishment of completed attempts.
112 Accordingly, even if a 106. A related weakness in the argument is that it relies on the attempter encountering similar criminal opportunities in the future. Consider a person who encounters an extremely profitable criminal opportunity today-so that he will not be deterred even if the expected ex-ante penalty for this crime is maximal-and that he is almost certain to never encounter profitable criminal opportunities in the future. In this case, inducing the criminal to abandon his crime today by fully excusing him for his abandoned attempt is the optimal solution. This person is not "dangerous," not because he lacks the intent to commit crime, but because he lacks future criminal opportunities. Therefore, it is best to prevent criminal harm through marginal deterrence today, as well as save the cost of imprisoning this person. In reality, of course, it is impossible to identify the likelihood with which various attempters will encounter profitable criminal opportunities in the future. But as this discussion demonstrates, attempts are not perfect signals of future dangerousness, even if criminals' preferences remain constant over time, as long as some attempters' face some probability of not encountering a profitable criminal opportunity in the future.
107. Shavell, Punishment of Attempts, supra note 6, at 438-44 (providing a deterrence based rationale for why less talented individuals ought to be punished less severely).
108. See supra Part III (identifying conditions under which crime is profitable ex-ante for the potential offender).
109. person who abandons his criminal plan and a person who completes his attempt were equally dangerous, the incremental net-benefit from increasing the imprisonment of the latter would still be greater than the incremental net-benefit from increasing the imprisonment of the former for the same amount of time. This is because the incapacitative benefits and ex-ante deterrence effects of punishment would be the same for the two types of individuals, but there would be an additional cost-in the form of loss of marginal deterrence, as demonstrated in Parts II and III-from severely punishing individuals who abandon their crimes. The first and second arguments outlined above rely on the nature of the information relating to the offender's dangerousness and produced by the act of abandoning. 113 In particular, the operating assumption in these arguments is that an abandoned attempt provides "weaker" information compared to a completed attempt concerning the dangerousness of the attempter. Information is "weaker" in the sense that we are not as certain about the dangerousness of the offender as we are when the offender has completed his attempt. It follows, intuitively, that the optimal reductions in the penalty for abandonment ought to hinge on the nature of the information revealed by the abandonment, and that it ought to be inversely related to the strength of the information revealed by the act of initiating and later abandoning the crime.
This criterion can be applied to Attempt 2 and Attempt 3 described in the Introduction. Attempter 2's strategic abandonment supplies strong information regarding his dangerousness because he demonstrates that his abandonment is not due to some reduction in his criminal tendency. On the other hand, Attempter 3's emotions towards his victim and his repentance signal that he has initiated a criminal plan while acting impulsively and/or irrationally, and that his attempt has shown him that he does not possess the mind-set necessary to murder another person. Hence, it appears reasonable to assume that Attempter 3 is less likely than Attempter 2 to recidivate.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, REMARKS AND EXTENSIONS
The preceding Parts of this Article demonstrate that the optimal sentence reduction for abandonment of an attempt depends on, among other things, the trade-off between marginal deterrence benefits and ex-ante deterrence costs. If the abandonment is caused by unpredictable changes in the criminal's tendencies to commit crime, then, ceteris paribus, the 113. The third argument, on the other hand, suggests that even assuming arguendo that all attempters reveal the same type of information, it is optimal to punish abandoned attempts less severely than completed attempts. Offenses for which the punishment is maximal are discussed further infra Part V.B.
incremental net-benefit from sentence reductions is higher, and therefore, such abandonments ought to be punished less severely. Furthermore, because incapacitative benefits from imprisonment are inversely related to the expected dangerousness of the offender, the mitigation in penalty for abandonment ought to be greater when the abandoned attempt provides weak information regarding his dangerousness.
This Part first compares the normative implications of the analysis presented in the preceding Parts to existing laws on abandonment. Then, it identifies policy implications and a number of issues that can benefit from a careful analysis in future research and considers and responds to potential criticisms.
A. Normative Implications Compared to Laws on Abandonment
A brief review of existing law is necessary to compare and contrast them with the normative implications of my analysis. As briefly discussed in the introduction, there is no general consensus among jurisdictions on the law of abandoned attempts. 114 Although abandonment was not a defense to attempts in common law, today it can affect the defendant's liability in one of two ways. 115 First, the abandoning defendant may escape liability under the theory that he did not possess the requisite intent for the attempt because "where the accused has changed his mind, it would be only just to interpret his previous intention where possible as only half-formed or provisional, and hold it to be insufficient mens rea."
116 Second, some jurisdictions recognize abandonment as a defense 117 where the abandonment occurs "under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose." 118 An abandonment that meets these criteria is generally a complete defense 119 rather than a mitigating factor for purposes of punishment.
120
Contrary to existing laws, my analysis suggests that, as a general matter, all abandoned attempts, without regard to whether they would be classified as voluntary or involuntary, ought to potentially be punished less severely than completed attempts. Furthermore, abandonment need not be subject to a dichotomous scheme such that it provides a full excuse or else no defense at all. Optimal punishment schemes require abandonments to be treated as mitigating factors in punishment and require that the magnitude in mitigation be determined by considering factors discussed above. These differences should not leave the impression that the normative implications of my analysis and existing laws are completely divergent; they are not. In fact, they have many similarities. In particular, the complete renunciation of criminal purpose requirement in many jurisdictions allowing a defense can be interpreted as a proxy for identifying the defendant's dangerousness. Similarly, the necessity of voluntary renunciation is often interpreted as a requirement that there be no "outside cause" 121 or "extraneous factor" 122 motivating the abandonment. This requirement can be thought of as providing a proxy for the predictability factor that I have identified, since intuitively, outside factors are more predictable than internal changes, including changes of heart. This brief comparison suggests that the law has equipped itself with instruments intended to serve purposes similar to those identified by my economic analysis but that it has chosen instruments that are too blunt. In particular, most laws create categories of abandonments that are too rigid by requiring that they either provide a full excuse or no defense at all. This claim is supported by the existence of cases where a strict reading of the law suggests one verdict, but the court produces the opposite one. In Commonwealth v. McCloskey, a prison inmate "scaled a fence within the prison walls that led to the recreation yard and then to the prison wall" before turning back and aborting his escape attempt. 126 The inmate stated that his abandonment was motivated by a desire to "not . 
135
It is impossible to know what exactly led to these creative interpretations, but it is plausible that according to intuitive notions of justice the defendants in McCloskey and McNeal ought to be punished, but less severely than the full punishment for a completed attempt. 136 In cases where this is not an option, the decision maker has to choose between full punishment or a full excuse and may be inclined to choose that one which is closest to what he finds is the just punishment for the defendant, even if the verdict cannot be easily supported by a strict reading of the law. 137 It is very plausible that in McCloskey the judge felt that the attempted escapee deserved a minor, rather than full, punishment. Similarly, in McNeal the judge could have felt that it would be unjust to let the defendant's conduct go unpunished. But because the legal mechanism in each state did not allow intermediate punishments, the judges may have been inclined to creatively interpret the law to produce results that are closer to their internal notions of justice.
In sum, the rigid categories created by the law of abandonments may be pushing decision makers to bend or creatively interpret the laws to get closer to the decision they find intuitively just. The existence of this problem may be interpreted as a sign that the law of abandonments has not yet evolved to its optimal form. Implementing the proposed punishment schemes in this Article appears to be a step in the right direction, especially since these punishment schemes further the goals of optimal deterrence and incapacitiation.
B. Dynamic Versus Static Effects when Group Interactions Are Present
The models presented in this Article focus on attempts committed by individuals. Without substantial modification they cannot be used for purposes of analyzing illegal conduct committed by multiple entities or individuals. Nevertheless, even when analyzing such criminal activity, including conspiracies and the formation and operation of cartels, it should be asked whether abandonment-type defenses ought to exist, and if so, how they ought to be structured. In answering these questions one must address a trade-off that is very similar to that identified in this Article, namely that between dynamic and static efficiency.
The use of leniency programs in the enforcement of antitrust laws provides a clear example of this trade-off in action. Under these programs a cartel member can avoid criminal liability by reporting the activities of the cartel to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
138 Self-reporting naturally raises the likelihood of successful detection and prosecution of illegal cartel activity 139 and thereby leads to static benefits. These benefits are in the form of elimination of cartel-induced, supra-competitive prices. But, like abandonment defenses, leniency programs can reduce ex-ante deterrence exercise discretion in sentencing criminals. In fact, a number of previous studies discuss how judges are tempted to impose shorter sentences when they are convinced that an offender is remorseful." (footnotes omitted)). Hence, a trade-off emerges between ex-ante deterrence and static benefits.
Although this trade-off is similar to that which has been identified in Parts II and III of this Article, a closer look reveals subtle differences. First, static benefits in the context of leniency programs are not completely analogous to the marginal deterrence benefits observed when considering individual attempts. Because these leniency programs lead to the dismantling of group ventures rather than the ceasing of activity of an individual, incentivizing each member of a conspiracy or cartel to cooperate with the DOJ results in the elimination of harm caused by multiple parties. Second, although abandonment defenses clearly reduce ex-ante costs to initiating crimes, the effect of leniency programs on cartel formation activity is ambiguous. A potential cartel participant knows that it is not the only entity that can act as a "whistle-blower." Therefore, leniency programs create distrust among cartel members and thereby can increase the likelihood with which cartels are dismantled after they are formed. This can in turn reduce the expected benefits associated with forming cartels, and increase ex-ante deterrence.
Accordingly, leniency programs are likely to produce static benefits that offset any costs that might exist due to reduction in ex-ante deterrence. This conjecture is consistent with current leniency programs in the United States, which provide "full immunity" 141 to corporations that cooperate with the government instead of mitigations in penalty; if the marginal net benefit from reducing the penalty for whistle-blowers is always positive, then it is optimal to provide the maximal reduction, which is equivalent to providing full immunity.
142
The identification of this trade-off in regards to leniency programs has important implications as to how abandonment defenses for conspiracies can potentially be reformed. Existing research on leniency programs demonstrates not only that leniency programs can be used to dismantle cartels but also that limiting full immunity to only the first cartel-member (2008) (noting that leniency programs may increase the benefit from continuing to collude: "In that colluding firms recognize that they may use the leniency program in the future (when the probability of detection is high), a more lenient program reduces the size of penalties in the event that a firm receives leniency. This . . . means that more leniency raises the expected payoff from continuing to collude.").
141. See Hammond, supra note 138, at 1. 142. See Motta and Polo, supra note 139, at 375 (coming to a similar conclusion: "when the [Antitrust Authority (AA)] has limited resources, leniency programs may be optimal in a second best perspective. Fine reductions, inducing firms to reveal information once an investigation is opened, increase the probability of ex-post desistence and save resources of the AA, thereby raising welfare. The optimal scheme requires maximum fine reduction, that is, the firms that collaborate with the Authority should not pay any fine.") to cooperate is likely to create a "race to the enforcer's door."
143 This effect reduces the expected benefits from colluding 144 and is therefore likely to increase ex-ante deterrence. Similarly, limiting abandonment defenses for conspiracies to the first party to take affirmative steps to report the conspiracy to law enforcers may generate greater ex-ante deterrence. However, further and meticulous research focusing on similarities and differences between cartel activity and other conspiracies is necessary to draw more accurate conclusions. In particular, it must be determined whether the dynamic-static trade-off in the criminal conspiracies context is sufficiently similar to that which exists in the cartel formation context to warrant transplanting strategies used in leniency programs to criminal conspiracy laws.
C. On the Use of Escalating Penalty Schemes to Mitigate the Loss in Incapacitative Benefits
Whether or not punishing an individual who abandons his criminal effort provides significant incapacitative benefits is uncertain. This uncertainty may be resolved, at least partially, through the use of escalating punishment schemes. 145 The main virtue of using escalating punishment schemes in conjunction with an abandonment defense is to cause marginal deterrence while preserving benefits similar to those that would be generated by the incapacitation function of imprisonment. 146 To exemplify how escalating penalty schemes result in these benefits, consider a penalty scheme that provides a penalty reduction for abandoned crimes but increases the penalty for any subsequent crime. This scheme generates marginal deterrence because whenever a criminal enters the "bad state," he will be inclined to abandon his crime. The scheme also reduces recidivism 143. See Hammond, supra note 138, at 3. 144. See Harrington, supra note 140, at 217 (showing that "[t]he Race to the Courthouse Effect results in a more lenient policy, lowering the expected payoff from colluding-making collusion more difficult").
145. A punishment scheme is escalating if the punishment for the second offense is greater than the punishment for a subsequent offense. There is a large L&E literature on escalating penalties, and despite this, there is no consensus on the conditions under which escalating penalties are optimal. reason, not deterred. Thus, a cheaper strategy may be to set a low initial punishment, and then to raise it for those who commit the act, thereby revealing their higher valuation. Under this escalating scheme, some early crime is tolerated in order to save on punishment costs.
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Whether or not the existing L&E literature provides convincing arguments for the use of escalating punishments can be debated. But as a practical matter, repeat-offender laws exist, 151 and there is very often room to implement escalating penalty schemes that increase the penalty for future crimes for people who have abandoned their attempts.
D. On Criminals' Ignorance of Laws
Most economic analyses of criminal law assume that laws affect potential offenders' incentives by adjusting the costs and benefits of committing crime. Another less explicit and perhaps antecedent assumption is that potential offenders are well informed of the details of criminal laws. Some scholars have recently questioned the validity of this assumption and have argued that in many circumstances criminals are unaware or imperfectly informed about the applicable criminal laws. 152 Because the model presented in Parts II and III also makes these assumptions, one may wonder whether the normative implications that are based on this model are reliable.
There is a very simple, yet powerful, defense against such criticisms. The particular law governing abandonment of attempts should not have any incentive effect on criminals that are truly uninformed of these laws. Therefore, the ex-ante as well as the marginal deterrence effect of laws on abandonment on these individuals is negligible. The incentive effects on these individuals can justifiably be ignored when discussing effects on social welfare. 153 If it is further assumed that there is a proportion of offenders, even if this proportion is small, whose incentives are affected by the particular law governing abandonment of attempts, then the laws can justifiably be structured to provide proper incentives only to these individuals. Hence, the normative implications derived by the models presented in this Article are still valid when one assumes that there are individuals who are uninformed of the laws, and another, perhaps smaller, group of individuals whose incentives are affected by the particular law on abandoned attempts.
E. On Interrupted Attempts
This Article is mainly concerned with the properties of optimal punishment schemes for abandoned attempts. Although it does not consider optimal punishments for interrupted attempts, one can form conjectures regarding this issue by relying on the insights provided in the preceding Parts.
When attempts are interrupted one cannot ascertain whether the attempter would have completed it or whether he would have abandoned it. This uncertainty, intuitively, makes interrupted attempts conceptually a hybrid between completed and abandoned attempts. 154 The facts surrounding the interruption might inform the fact finder about how close that particular interrupted attempt is to one category versus the other. However, in many cases this type of information will not be available. In these cases, priors regarding the likelihood with which an attempt would have been completed but for the interruption become important. To the extent that this prior is high, the interrupted attempt ought to be punished with a sanction close to the corresponding sanction for completed attempts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have used standard L&E tools to identify costs and benefits associated with defenses that provide penalty mitigations for abandoning of attempts. Penalty mitigations provide incentives to offenders who initiate criminal plans to abandon their unlawful efforts, while reducing the expected cost to initiating criminal plans in the first place. Moreover, abandonment defenses may reduce incapacitative benefits 154. If courts made no errors in categorizing attempts as interrupted versus abandoned, then interrupted attempts would be hybrids only in terms of their information revealing features. Shavell, Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, supra note 6, makes a similar point at 1251: "[P]unishing interrupted attempts less severely than acts that result in harm may be advantageous. Since interrupted attempts may later be abandoned or fail, there is less evidence of the dangerousness of interrupted attempts and less reason for sanctioning them than acts that actually do result in harm." However, they would be similar to completed attempts in terms of their inability to generate marginal deterrence. If, however, courts make errors in categorizing attempts, then a penalty reduction for interrupted attempts would produce a small marginal deterrence effect because the offender would be punished less severely when he abandons his crime but is subsequently punished for an interrupted attempt due to the court's erroneous categorization of the attempt. associated with punishment. The trade-off between these costs and benefits is affected by the characteristics of offenders. The predictability of the events that led to the abandonment and the information regarding the offender's dangerousness that is revealed through the abandonment provide insights regarding the characteristics of the offender and should therefore be taken into account in determining the appropriate magnitude of mitigation. The analysis suggests that abandoned attempts ought to be punished less severely than completed attempts, and the mitigation ought to be large when the abandonment is due to unpredictable events that reveal that the offender has a low likelihood of recidivating.
